Introduction
From the early 1960s through the early 1980s, Korean banking institutions essentially served as agents of the government channeling investment funds to selected sectors under the country's economic development policy. The policy was designed to accelerate South Korea's transition from an agrarian economy to a modern industrialized state. By most accounts, the country was very successful in achieving its industrialization goals. Measured by any international standard, the economic development of South Korea over the last three decades has been exceptional. The policies supporting rapid industrialization and export growth placed South Korea among the world's fastest growing newly industrialized countries.
1
The government's extensive involvement in the banking and financial markets during the period from 1960 to 1980 led to serious imbalances in the financial markets and in the industrial structure of the economy. As overall financial repression intensified, the deadweight costs associated with excessive regulation adversely impacted the efficiency of the financial system and resource allocation more generally. Restrictions on bank lending which favored loans to chaebol groups, i.e., large family controlled industrial conglomerates, as well as export and strategic industries, caused small and medium sized firms to turn to the informal sector for financing. The repression encouraged the growth of the informal credit market at the expense of the banking sector and more efficient resource allocation. An additional and perhaps more important implication of excessive government involvement in the banking system was the erosion of effective credit evaluation and risk assessment policies. As has been well documented, Korean banks had little discretion in allocating funds and therefore, little incentive to screen and monitor the activities of corporate customers. As a result, the banking sector became increasingly vulnerable to unbridled corporate expansion. When the economy experienced the recent downturn (due, in part to the weakening of the Japanese yen against the dollar, and the fact that many chaebols and related firms either went bankrupt or sustained financial difficulties) Korean banks suffered immensely. The subsequent ballooning of nonperforming loans on bank balance sheets and the resulting erosion of equity capital resulted in the collapse of numerous Korean banks.
While much of the blame for the ultimate collapse of the Korean growth miracle might be directed towards the unholy alliance of the government, the banks, and the chaebol, the adverse side effects of the alliance did not go unnoticed. Beginning in the early 1980s the government, in response to mounting public pressure, undertook a series of steps to liberalize the financial system.
2 Key among the steps were: reprivatization of the banking industry, removal of interest rate ceilings and entry restrictions, reduction of government directed lending, expanded product deregulation, and reduction of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, among others. Additional reforms were implemented in 1991 to further liberalize the financial system: interest rates were further deregulated, greater autonomy was given to bank managements, bank security holdings and maturities on loans were liberalized, and further liberalization of foreign exchange transactions and foreign investment was undertaken. Only recently have the effectiveness of these liberalization efforts been examined. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) recently examined the effectiveness of the Korean liberalization efforts of the early 1980s. These authors examined changes in productivity among Korean banks during the 1980-1994 period using Malmquist indexes of productivity. By using Malmquist indexes of productivity, Gilbert and Wilson were able to decompose productivity changes among the newly privatized Korean banks into changes in technical efficiency and changes in technology. The authors found that between 1980 and the mid-1990s, as Korea was privatizing banks and deregulating its financial industry, banks dramatically changed their mix of inputs and outputs. These changes, when combined with technological developments, led to significant improvements in productivity and enhanced the potential output of the Korean banking sector.
As noted above, we believe that the Korean financial repression, while contributing to the growth miracle, also increased the deadweight costs associated with excessive governmental interference in the financial system. Gilbert and Wilson are sympathetic to this view as they conclude that, "whatever positive effects government control of the financial system may have had on growth of the Korean economy in the 1960s and 1970s must be weighed against the negative effects on the productivity of Korean banks."
In this paper we examine the productive efficiency of a sample of private Korean banks over the 1985 to 1995 time period. Our goal is to identify the key determinants of Korean bank efficiency (inefficiency) following the program of deregulation initiated by the government in the early 1980s and augmented in the early 1990s. Thus, we expand on the work of Gilbert and Wilson by identifying the key determinants of efficiency and by investigating the relationship between the macroeconomic performance of the Korean economy and banking industry efficiency. In section 2 of the paper, we set the stage for our analysis by briefly reviewing the recent history of the Korean banking system. In section 3, we examine whether the government's program of financial liberalization enhanced the productive efficiency of our sample banks. In contrast to Gilbert and Wilson, in section 4 we measure the efficiency of our sample banks directly from the banks' cost functions. This approach allows us to estimate a second stage efficiency regression to identify the key determinants of operating efficiency (inefficiency). In addition, we investigate whether the form of ownership was a key determinant of bank efficiency and examine our sample on a disaggregated basis in an effort to identify other key characteristics correlated with efficiency. A conclusion follows in section 5. Finally, in section 6 we discuss the efforts of the Korean government to restructure the banking system following its recent collapse. In particular, we comment on the ongoing efforts of the government to merge and close weak and failed banks in light of our findings regarding the measured efficiency (inefficiency) of our sample banks.
Brief History of the Korean Banking System
The Korean banking system has undergone numerous transformations since the With the inception of the first five-year economic plan, the Korean government sought to increase project financing by creating specialized banks that operated outside the authority of the central bank. Government policymakers set quantitative credit targets to channel funds to favored light industries such as cement, steel and fertilizers. While specialized banks provided long-term credit, commercial banks were directed by the government to supply short-term working capital. Commercial banks even lacked the autonomy to set their own interest rates on deposits and loans, rather they were set in accordance with the government's overall economic plans. Real interest rates on ordinary and economic development policy loans were frequently lower than the estimated average real rates of return and in some cases negative (See SaKong, 1993) .
Well into the 1970s, subsequent five-year development plans increased government intervention into the banking and financial sectors. However, during this period the government recognized that Korea could no longer maintain its economic competitiveness by focusing on light manufacturing. Consequently, the government's focus shifted from aiding domestic light industry towards aiding heavy industrial products such as machinery, electronics, chemicals, autos, and shipbuilding. During this time, commercial banks were instructed to allow easy credit access and favorable loans rates to these industries. This required additional sources of funding that existing commercial banks were unable to meet. Subsequently, the government established specialized banks to fill the gap. Toward the latter part of the 1970s, policy loans, i.e., loans which supported government programs, accounted for nearly 80 percent of domestic credit extended during that period. During the 1970s, tightly regulated non-bank financial institutions were introduced in an effort to diversify financing sources and to attract funds into the organized market.
The industrial policy of the Korean government during this period gave rise to the chaebol groups. The development strategy bolstered the expansion of existing firms into targeted sectors through preferential access to bank credit at below-market rates. These firms not only expanded rapidly into many areas of specialization but also into many which were not explicitly targeted by government policy. As a result, these firms grew into economic conglomerates and dominated the Korea economy. These firms also held equity investments in the commercial banks.
Although the economy was growing at a rapid pace under this strategy, some government policymakers recognized that privatization and deregulation of the banking sector was imperative. Market mechanisms provide banks with the incentive to exert selfdiscipline to effectively allocate financial resources, which is necessary to sustain economic The General Banking Act was revised again in 1991, 1993, and 1994. These revisions gave commercial banks further autonomy in their business activities and management. For example, banks were allowed to act as leading underwriters for government and public bonds. In 1991, a four-stage plan for the full liberalization of interest rates was announced to effectively set the price mechanism of interest rates.
Through interest rate deregulation, the competitiveness of domestic financial services industry could be strengthened to cope with continued global financial liberalization.
As is evident from the recent collapse of the Korean banking system, the liberalization initiatives were, in a larger sense, proven ineffective. In the years leading up to the crisis, chaebols suffered from heavy financial pressure due to low earnings on their highly leveraged investment projects. Despite the deterioration of corporate financial performance, bank lending to the chaebols and corporate debt/equity ratios continued to grow. By the end of 1997, the debt/equity ratio of the 30 largest chaebols reached an average of 600 percent.
With a mounting domestic debt and growing number of large corporate failures, Korean banks are currently bearing the consequences of widespread corporate insolvency.
As such, the country's current economic crisis demands a serious evaluation of both the financial reforms and the collusive links among the Korean government, the chaebol, and the privatized banking industry. As of late 1998, most bank stocks were trading well under $1 per share. Twelve small merchant banks and five small commercial banks were closed by the Korean government following the imposition of an International Monetary
Fund rescue package. In addition, the government is currently engaged in a major restructuring of the banking system as the crisis continues. These more recent developments are discussed in section 5 of the paper.
Data and Empirical Methodology
Our sample data was taken from the annual balance sheets and income statements of 19 private Korean banks from 1985 to 1995 (See Table 1 The data used in the correlation analysis which associates macroeconomic performance with the efficiency index were taken from the "World Tables" published by the World Bank.
Bank Efficiency
Our study of efficiency provides for a better understanding of market competitiveness and profitability. Such an analysis, in turn, can provide policymakers with information which may prove valuable in the design of public policy. The methodology allows us to identify best practice banks and thus might be useful in decisions regarding merging and closing banks. Rather than concentrating on traditional scale and scope analysis of productive efficiency, we concentrate on management efficiency. This focus results from recent research in banking which indicates that management's ineffectiveness in managing resources accounts for a significantly higher percentage of costs in banking compared to scale and scope efficiencies . Furthermore, instead of comparing the operating performance of our sample banks with a set of superior-operated banks by using financial ratios, we use production theory and econometric procedures to extract information on managerial efficiency.
The stochastic frontier approach was used to calculate a measure of production efficiency for each bank in our sample (see Aigner et al., 1977 and Meeusen and Broeck, 1977) . This approach uses a parametric technique to estimate the characteristics of "bestpractice" banks from bank cost functions. These best-practice banks represent institutions which produce their financial products and services at the lowest cost using the most efficient mix of productive inputs or factors of production. Individual bank efficiency indices were measured by computing the deviations of costs from the cost frontier estimated from the sample data. This inefficiency factor captures both allocative inefficiencies from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs, and technical inefficiencies resulting from employing excessive amount of the inputs to produce outputs.
In this framework, systematic deviations of cost from the frontier or best-practice levels are associated with poor management while random deviations can be attributed to uncontrollable factors that affect total costs, such as weather, luck, labor strikes, or machine performance.
The stochastic frontier cost function approach maintains that managerial or controllable inefficiencies only increase costs above best-practice levels and that random fluctuations or uncontrollable factors can either increase or decrease costs. Therefore, the model assumes that inefficiencies follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution, while random fluctuations follow the typical assumption of a symmetric normal distribution.
To calculate each bank's efficiency index, we first fitted a stochastic frontier cost function to characterize the efficient frontier for the sample banks. The form of the cost function is a standard translog cost function:
( 1) where TC is the total cost of inputs used to produce the bank's various outputs. TC includes all labor costs, physical capital expenses, and allocated interest expenses. Thus, we use the intermediation approach to the analysis of bank production which requires that ln~TC~=~alpha~+~sum from {j = 1} to 3 beta_j ~ln~Y_j~+~1 over 2 ~sum from {j = 1} to 3 sum from {k = 1} to 3beta_jk~ln~Y_j~ln~Y_k~+~sum from {n = 1} to 3 gamma_n~ ln~w_n#+~1 over 2~ sum from {n = 1} to 3 sum from {p = 1} to 3gamma_np~ln~w_n~ln~w_p~+~ _i~ln~Z~+~1 over 2~ the output metric be defined in terms of dollars of loans and deposits rather than by the number of accounts and that interest expense be included in total cost. Allocated interest equals the product of the ratio of investments to earning assets times total interest expense. The allocation of interest was necessary because securities are specified as output and many banks incur substantial interest costs in financing their securities portfolio. The Y j are three output quantities included in the cost function: total loans and securities, demand deposits, and fee income. Total loans are comprised of all retail loans, which include residential real estate, agricultural, personal, credit card and other loans, all commercial, industrial, and security loans and investments. Fee income is used to proxy other bank outputs. It is equal to the service charges and fees received on transaction and nontransaction accounts. The prices of inputs, W n , used in the production of bank assets are the wage rate, interest for borrowed funds, and the price of physical capital. The wage rate is calculated by dividing total salaries and fringe benefits by the number of full-time equivalent employees. The interest for borrowed funds is calculated by taking the ratio of total interest expense to the sum of total funds. The price of physical capital equals the ratio of total expenses of premises and fixed assets to total assets. The cost function also includes the variable Z, equity capital for each bank, to adjust for increased costs of funds due to financial risk. The composite error terms, u and v, capture cost inefficiency and random error. The u is assumed to be normally distributed with truncation below zero.
The v, on the other hand, is assumed to be independently, identically and normally distributed. Finally, ln denotes the natural logarithm. Standard homogeneity and symmetry restrictions were imposed in estimating the parameters of the cost function. 
We measure efficiency (EFF) by comparing the inefficiency index of each bank with the index of the most efficient bank. This gives a good measure of relative efficiency in the sample. The efficiency measure is bounded between 0 and 1. EFF is 1 for the most efficient bank, and close to 0 for the least efficient bank.
Efficiency and Its Determinants
Average estimated cost efficiency scores for the entire sample of banks for each of the 11 years are presented in Table 3 Mester, 1996 and Mester, 1997) .
The average bank in our sample would have increased its efficiency level about 11.03 percent had it been able to operate on the efficient frontier. In other words, about 11.03 percent of costs are avoidable on average relative to a best-practice bank. Table 3 describes statistics for estimated EFF for each of 11 years in our sample.
A nonparametric sign test applied to this data shows that there is no inter-temporal improvement in either the mean or standard deviation of cost efficiency index over the sample period. Given the results reported in Gilbert and Wilson (1998) We examine the sources of efficiency by estimating a second stage efficiency regression. In this regression, the relationship between our efficiency index, EFF, and a set of economic, structural, and financial variables is explored. The second stage regression model is specified as follows:
As noted earlier, the efficiency measure is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, the function used to specify equation (3) operative strategies to attain a higher level of efficiency. This follows the concept of "learning by doing." However, given that Korean banks have undergone periods of nationalization followed by periods of privatization, it is not clear that older banks will necessarily be more efficient than younger banks. The variable lnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets and is included to control for the impact of scale bias on efficiency. GROW is the growth rate of bank assets over the previous 12 months. This variable provides a standard measure for bank performance. Many studies have found that rapid asset growth does not always lead to improved performance. However, it is quite possible that more efficient banks grow faster by the very fact that they are efficient.
Thus, we have no a priori expectations regarding the sign on the GROW variable. The variables STA and BTD are the ratios of salaries-to-assets and branches-to-deposits, respectively. They provide measures of the impact of overhead expenses on efficiency.
Since they capture expense behavior, we expect these variables to have negative coefficients. STA2, the square of STA, is also included to capture nonlinear effects. ETA is the ratio of total employees-to-total assets. This ratio is used to measure the effect of f(x) ~=~{e^x} over {1~+~e^x}, labor force size on efficiency. Since labor unions in Korea are quite strong and wield much control in the banking sector, we expect this variable to have a negative impact on bank efficiency. This is because unions can cause rapid increases in wages even when not justified by increases in worker productivity. The unions may also prevent banks from reducing their labor forces when it is clearly called for. DDTD is the ratio of demand deposits-to-total deposits and is included to capture the impact of deposit mix on efficiency. Having a higher proportion of demand deposits increases the level of efficiency because banks can utilize this source of financial capital (core deposits) without incurring high interest cost. NINTOP is noninterest income over operating profits. This ratio measures the impact of output mix on efficiency. The coefficient of NINTOP could be positive or negative depending on the bank's expertise and strategic objective. We would expect it to be positive if a bank has the technical ability to offer noninterest income product lines, i.e., fee based services, which permit the bank to achieve a higher level of efficiency from its resources (especially its human capital). We would expect it to be negative if the bank human capital resources and expertise is oriented more towards traditional commercial and industrial lending activities. Finally, NATION is included to capture the possible difference in efficiency between the nationwide and regional banks. It is equal to 1 if the bank is national and 0 if it is regional. To allow for the possibility that the effects of STA and BTD on the level of efficiency are different for nationwide banks, each of these two variables was interacted with the NATION variable. Since they are overhead expense variables, we expect the interaction terms to have negative coefficients.
EC, equity capital, is included to adjust for different risk levels among the sample banks.
Finally, an indicator variable, REFORM, is included in the model to capture any effects of the 1991 deregulations. The results of the second stage efficiency regression are presented in Table 5 . As can be seen in this table, growth (GROWTH), the square of the ratio salaries-to-assets (STA2), the ratio of the number of employees-to-total assets (ETA), the ratio of demand deposits-to-total deposits (DDTD), the nationwide banking indicator (NATION), the interaction variable for salaries-to-assets with nationwide banking (STA*NATION), and the interaction variable for branches-to-deposits with nationwide banking (BTD*NATION) all had a statistically significant impact on bank efficiency. The results imply that banks with higher rates of growth enjoyed higher levels of efficiency. As noted above, some studies have reported finding a negative relationship between asset growth and efficiency. We interpret our finding as being consistent with a positive demand side effect of efficient operations, i.e., more effective service levels and/or better combinations of prices and quality. The coefficient estimate on the STA2 variable has a negative sign.
Second Stage Regression Results
Given that STA is not statistically significant, this result is difficult to interpret. It is quite possible that this variable is picking up elements of the tradeoff between capital and labor in production.
The coefficient estimate for ETA accords with our a priori expectations. The larger the number of bank employees per million won the less efficient is the bank.
Similarly, the coefficient on the variable, DDTD, measuring the source of bank funding, accords with our a priori expectations regarding the efficiency benefits of using cheap funding sources on the balance sheet. Nationwide banking franchises were found to be significantly more efficient than regional franchises and likely reflects better access to inputs. As expected, the interaction terms involving the ratios salaries-to-total assets and branches-to-total deposits and nationwide banking had significantly negative coefficient estimates. Thus, although nationwide franchises were more efficient, the positive effects were offset when nationwide banks paid higher salaries relative to total assets (or employed more employees relative to assets) and under took large investments in branches to attract deposits. Finally, the financial deregulation of 1991 had no statistically significant effect on the level of efficiency. This is most likely due to the fact that most of the improvements in efficiency may have been realized during the years preceding 1985, the beginning point of our analysis. That is, immediately following the major reforms undertaken in the early 1980 and 1981. It is also quite possible that the reforms undertaken in 1991 may take longer to produce visible results, or that they simply will not have any impact on bank efficiency.
Auxiliary Findings
Reliable data on the percentage of chaebol and foreign equity ownership in our sample banks was not available for the years examined in this study. Similarly, reliable data on the level of nonperforming loans was not available. However, some reliable data on each of these variables has become available recently as a result of the ongoing financial crisis in Korea. Using chaebol and foreign equity ownership data and nonperforming loans data for the year 1996, we computed the correlation between these ownership characteristics and the average efficiency scores of our sample banks. 7 The results of this auxiliary analysis produced some interesting findings.
The nationwide banks that improved their efficiency scores following the 1991 deregulation (a total of 6 banks) had lower bad loans ratios, higher foreign equity ownership, and higher chaebol equity ownership than those who did not have increasing efficiency scores. Conversely, the 5 regional banks that improved their efficiency levels following the 1991 deregulation, had lower bad loans ratios, and lower foreign and chaebol ownership percentages.
Of the 6 nationwide banks that improved their efficiency levels after the financial reforms instituted in 1991, 3 improved by a statistically significant amount with a confidence level of 10 percent. The specific banks were the Cho Hung Bank, Korea First Bank, and Hanil Bank. Comparing those banks that improved their efficiency levels after the 1991 deregulation, the nationwide banks were more efficient than the regional banks.
However, the differences between these efficiency improving banks were not statistically significant.
We also examined the correlation between the average efficiency scores of our sample banks and some indicators of the macroeconomic performance of the Korean economy. In this analysis, the correlations were computed using data which was available for the years 1985 to 1993. The level of broad money, i.e., non-demand deposits and currency, was found to be positively correlated with the average efficiency score of the sample banks. Similarly, imports of nonfactor services was positively correlated with the efficiency. The level of real long-term government debt was found to be negatively correlated with the average efficiency score of our sample banks. Curiously, the level of real exports of goods and nonfactor services was found to be negatively correlated with the average efficiency score of our sample banks. This might be related directly to the negative consequences to the banking sector of the government policy encouraging export related lending. Finally, the efficiency index is positively correlated with the level of foreign equity ownership but negatively correlated with the level of government ownership.
Conclusion
In this paper we extend the analysis of Gilbert and Wilson (1998) period. Using these efficiency scores, we fit a second stage efficiency regression. We found that banks with faster growth rates, operating nationwide and which made extensive use of core deposits in funding their assets were most efficient. As might be expected given the strength of Korean labor unions, banks with fewer employees per million won in assets were more efficient. We also examined the correlation between banking sector average efficiency and indicators of macroeconomic performance. We found that average bank efficiency was positively correlated with foreign equity ownership in the banks, and broad measure of money. Average efficiency was negatively correlated with the level of long-term private sector debt and the level of real goods exports.
6.

Epilogue 8
Following the Korean economic crisis, the country's unemployment rate reached its highest level in 31 years and during the first half of 1998, the country's GDP shrunk 5.3 percent-the largest drop in Korean history. In 1998, the GDP growth was estimated to be Coefficients with ***, ** and * are statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels of significance.
Endnotes
1
For a discussion of the South Korean growth miracle, see for example, Park (1998). 2 In the early 1950s, banks were owned by the government. After a brief period of privatization in the late 1950s, banks were once again nationalized in the early 1960s. Near the end of the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the government again privatized the banking system. An additional series of financial reforms took place in the early 1980s and were augmented again in the 1990s.
3
Beginning in 1984, banks were permitted to vary their lending rates within a limited range depending on the creditworthiness of borrowers and to increase competition, openness, and efficiency, the government further lowered both entry barriers for bank and non-bank financial institutions and restrictions upon foreign bank branches. New commercial banks and investment and mutual savings companies were established as a result of the policy change. Discriminatory restrictions were also reduced to allow for equal treatment between foreign and domestic banks. Foreign banks were able to access the central bank rediscount window for financing, and engage in trust activities.
4
There were a total of 26 commercial banks operating in the country during the period of our study. The 7 banks not included in the sample either had missing and unreliable data or were not deemed to be true private banks.
5
It should be noted that trust account assets are included in the computation of the capital ratio. If these assets are deleted, the average capital-to-assets ratio of our sample banks is about 9.4% percent, a number which compares favorably with the B.I.S. standard of 8 percent.
6
The average efficiency for our sample of Korean banks also compares favorably with estimates for the banks in the U.K., Germany, Sweden, Spain, and Canada, among others. See, Berger and Humphrey (1997) .
7 This analysis assumes that the level of nonperforming loans and the percentages of chaebol and foreign equity ownership in the banks as of 1996 fairly characterizes the percentages in previous years.
